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Foreword
The purpose of PPNN Issue Reviews is to highlight and ana-
lyse issues within the general area of nuclear non- prolifera-
tion that have special topical relevance.  Contents of Issue
Reviews are the sole responsibility of their authors.  Their
publication does not necessarily imply agreement with their
contents by members of PPNN’s Core Group collectively or
individually, its funders, or members of its staff.
Background
At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a
decision was made to give this Treaty an indefinite duration.
This decision was mutually conditioned by two further
decisions on Strengthening the Review Process and on Prin-
ciples and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Dis-
armament and a resolution, sponsored by the three NPT
depositary states, on the Middle East.  The first of the
decisions mandated changes to the function and operation of
Review Conferences and their Preparatory Committees (Prep-
Coms).  With regard to the PrepComs, these were expected to
make recommendations on substance and on the establishment
of subsidiary bodies at Review Conferences in addition to
their traditional procedural tasks.  At the last session of the
PrepCom for the 2000 NPT Review Conference in 1999, no
such recommendations were forthcoming.   As a consequence,
the PrepCom stated in its report1 (para.32) that:
The 2000 Review Conference should examine the functioning of
the review process itself, taking account of experience since 1995,
and may wish to reflect appropriately the conclusions of its
examination.
Given its origins in a political bargaining process among a
group of states with a wide range of perspectives on its sub-
stance and purpose,  it should not have been surprising that
problems would emerge over the implementation of the
decision on Strengthening the Review Process.  In evaluating
what these have been, this Issue Review will briefly review
the contents of the decision; examine what occurred in the
three sessions of the PrepCom for the 2000 NPT Review
Conference that took place in 1997, 1998 and 1999; offer an
appraisal of the functioning of the strengthened review
process in those sessions; and consider some options for the
types of conclusions that might emerge from the examination
of the functioning of the review by the Review Conference.
The 1995 Decision on Strengthening the Review
Process
The 1995 decision on Strengthening the Review Process con-
tained three paragraphs related exclusively to NPT Review
Conferences, two to the PrepComs for them, and one to both.
The first of the paragraphs dealing with Review Conferences,
(para.2), formalised and confirmed what had already become
a customary practice, namely that they should be held every
five years.  A second, (para.5), ‘concluded that the present
structure of three main Committees should continue’, and set
out methods of preventing overlaps between their work.  The
third, (para.7), emphasised that Review Conferences should:
look forward as well as back.  They should evaluate the results of
the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of
undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the
areas in which, and the means through which, further progress
should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also
address specifically what might be done to strengthen the
implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.
One of the paragraphs dealing with the PrepComs (para.3)
mandated the holding of their sessions ‘normally for a dura-
tion of 10 working days’ in ‘each of the three years prior to the
Review Conference’. It also allowed for a fourth session to be
held in the year of the Conference. A second (para.4) specified
that these PrepCom sessions were to have two tasks.  One task
was:
to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the
full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and
to make recommendations therein to the Review Conference.
The ‘principles, objectives and ways’  were to include those
identified in the Principles and Objectives decision.  The
second task was to ‘make the procedural preparations for the
next Review Conference.’
The final paragraph (para.6) dealt with both Review Con-
ferences and their PrepComs.  It sought to facilitate a ‘focused
consideration’ of ‘specific issues relevant to the Treaty’ by
making it possible to establish ‘subsidiary bodies’ within ‘the
respective Main Committees’.  It delegated the task of recom-
mending the establishment of such bodies ‘in relation to the
specific objectives of the Review Conference’ to ‘the
Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference’.
Several issues were not directly addressed in the document
containing this decision, including:
• the substantive agenda for the PrepCom sessions;
• whether PrepCom sessions could undertake tasks other than
making recommendations to Review Conferences;
• what were to be the specific outcomes or products of Prep-
Com sessions and  Review Conferences; and
• the functions of the ‘subsidiary bodies’ that PrepComs
could recommend for creation within the Main Committees
of Review Conferences.
In addition, it should be noted that the second decision docu-
ment, that on Principles and Objectives, stated in its preamble
that it was the product of a desire for:
a set of principles and objectives in accordance with which nuclear
non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be
vigorously pursued and progress, achievements and shortcomings
evaluated periodically within the review process provided for in
article VIDI, paragraph 3, of the Treaty.
However, this document did not specify how this evaluation
was to be implemented.
The 1997 PrepCom Session2
The strengthened review process began in April 1997 with the
opening of the first session of the PrepCom for the 2000 NPT
Review Conference in New York. After a short, formal
general debate, the parties engaged in informal discussions on
three ‘sets of issues (clusters)’, which bore a very close
resemblance to the items covered by each of the Main Com-
mittees in 1995.  Equal time was allocated for the discussions
within each of these clusters.  A decision was taken that ‘sum-
mary records would be provided at each session of the
Committee’s opening meeting, the general debate and the
closing meeting’.  Representatives of Non-Governmental Or-
ganisations (NGOs) were allowed to address the delegations
in the conference room during a half-day session set aside for
this purpose, and were allowed to be present at the meetings
where summary records were to be taken.
The 1997 PrepCom session resulted in three types of activity
taking place:
• the circulation of working papers on a variety of topics, in a
manner similar to Review Conferences;
• a general debate on each of the clusters of issues, with
prepared statements being made on national positions,
rather than any spontaneous dialogue occurring between
the parties; and
• the convening by the Chairman of an informal Consultative
Group of 20–25 states, which sought to produce a
document reporting on the outcome of the session.
The latter body concentrated its attention on two issues:
• producing a ‘rolling text’ on substantive matters that might
be passed on to the Review Conference; and
• agreeing on a set of recommendations to the 1998 PrepCom
session on how this session might conduct its business.
The result of this activity was a document containing four
elements:
• a report on substantive and procedural issues relevant to the
2000 Review Conference and the 1998 PrepCom session
[pp. 1–9];
• a Chairman’s Statement [p. 10];
• the summary records of the 1997 session [Annex I, p. 11];
and
• a Chairman’s Working Paper [Annex II, pp. 12–44].
In practice, the report on the session did not cover the substan-
tive discussions, but did record the procedural decisions that
had been taken.  The Chairman’s Statement arose from the
desire of some delegations to have a more focused discussion
at the 1998 PrepCom session on certain key issues [security
assurances, the Resolution on the Middle East and a ban on the
production of fissile materials for nuclear explosive devices].
The summary records contained a reference to their document
numbers only, while the Chairman’s Working Paper contained
a recommendation that in 1998:
the official documents and other proposals submitted by
delegations ... will be taken into account during further work on
draft recommendations to the Review Conference and also the
working paper submitted by the Chairman which will be
interpreted in the light of the official documents and other
proposals made by delegations.
This Working Paper contained two substantive elements:
• text where general agreement existed ‘pending final agree-
ment on all draft recommendations at the last session’; and
• a collation of the many proposals that had been made by
delegations in the course of the session, structured around
similar sub-headings.
No attempt was made in this Working Paper to separate the
forward looked elements from the backward looking ones.
Some participants saw the first element of the Chairman’s
Working Paper as the basis for negotiated texts on the substan-
tive products of the PrepCom and the Review Conference,
with the second element serving as a ‘resource’ which the
PrepCom and the Review Conference might draw upon in its
future work.  In addition, it is worthy of note that the nuclear-
weapon states made a single joint statement in the course of
the session, and several made national ones, detailing the
progress they had made in fulfilling their disarmament com-
mitments under Article VI of the Treaty.  This indicated that
they saw the PrepCom sessions as places where they were
expected to offer an accounting of their disarmament activities
over the previous year or years.
The 1998 PrepCom Session3
This PrepCom session comprised a plenary debate; three
cluster discussions, with time allocated at the end of each
cluster for an exchange of views on the special topics selected
in 1997; and a discussion and negotiation on recommenda-
tions to the next PrepCom and the 2000 Review Conference.
The cluster debates once again involved prepared statements
but few meaningful exchanges.  Four sets of significant dis-
agreements emerged from these discussions:
• whether the PrepCom sessions should be seeking to
generate a rolling text for transmission to the Review Con-
ference, or would produce its recommendations to the
Review Conference in some other way at the final session
of the PrepCom;
• whether the sessions would be ‘mini-review’ meetings,
whose main function  would be to subject the implementa-
tion of the Treaty and the objectives contained in the Prin-
ciples and Objectives decision to a review almost every
year, with a brief substantive report on its discussions being
produced on each session;
• whether rule 34 of the rules of procedure should be
amended to take into account the ‘subsidiary bodies’ that
the decision document on Strengthening the Review
Conference mandated PrepComs to recommend for crea-
tion by NPT Review Conferences; and
• differences over the status and implications of the 1995
Resolution on the Middle East and how it might be
implemented.
Attempts to develop the texts inherited from the 1997 Prep-
Com session were slow to get under way, concentrating ini-
tially on editing the lengthy collation of proposals contained in
the second part of the Chairman’s Working Paper from the
previous year.  By the middle of the second week, the deep
divisions over rule 34; the Canadian proposal for a report on
the substantive discussions; and the Resolution on the Middle
East were becoming increasingly obvious.  At that point the
Chairman took a decision to reorient his consultations around
three working groups, focusing on:
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• ‘enriching’ the first section of the 1997 Chairman’s
Working Paper;
• trying to resolve the most urgent procedural issues, includ-
ing rule 34 and the allocation of time to specific subjects in
the next PrepCom session; and
• the Canadian proposal for a report on the substantive
discussions.4
By the final evening some progress had been made by the first
of these working groups, little by the second and an amended
version of the text proposed by Canada for the substantive
report was in existence from the third.  This included language
on the Resolution on the Middle East.  However, when the
latter was considered in plenary, the United States repre-
sentative indicated his objection in principle to this document,
as he argued that it had no direct linkage to the sole substantive
task given to the PrepCom in the 1995 decision, namely
making recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference. A
request was then made by Canada for the document to be
considered paragraph by paragraph, with the states parties
indicating if they agreed with each paragraph in turn.  When
the paragraph dealing with the Resolution on the Middle East
was objected to by the United States, however, the chair of the
Non-Aligned caucus group indicated that his group were not
prepared to proceed further if this paragraph was not in the
report of the session.  At this point, further efforts to reach
agreement on both this draft report on current substantive
issues, and on all other matters, were abandoned.
As a consequence, in 1998:
• there was no Chairman’s Statement on how the 1999 Prep-
Com session was to be organised;
• there was no Chairman’s Working Paper, though the work
that had been done on the two elements of the 1997
Chairman’s Working Paper was annexed to the formal
report of the session as a working paper;
• no decisions had been taken on the production of the back-
ground documents for the 2000 Review Conference;
• no recommendations had been agreed for the creation of
‘subsidiary bodies’ at the Review Conference; and
• no decisions had been taken on the rewording of para. 34 of
the draft rules of procedure to incorporate specific wording
on such bodies.
The 1999 PrepCom Session5
The 1999 session of the PrepCom started with a single day
devoted to a plenary exchange of views.  Many of the state-
ments and exchanges made during this opening session, the
cluster debates which followed, and the discussions on the
three topics selected for a special allocation of time in 1997,
reflected the deteriorating international security environment.
NATO enlargement; nuclear sharing; a Central European
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ); US national and theatre
missile defence systems; the Middle East; interim measures of
arms control; the South Asian nuclear tests; START; tactical
nuclear weapons and no-first-use agreements all figured
prominently in these statements.  In addition, China made
clear from the start that, following the aerial bombing of its
embassy in Belgrade by NATO, its interventions would be
strongly influenced by these events.  After the general ex-
change of views, the Chairman convened debates in three
clusters, with time again allocated within each for the subjects
earmarked for special consideration at the 1997 session.
The second week of the session was devoted to producing
recommendations for the Conference.  This was assisted by
extensive informal consultations, which produced agreement
on many of the outstanding procedural issues, including:
• designation of the Conference President (who subsequently
withdrew after being transferred to another post by his
government and a new one had to be designated) and the
nomination of its Secretary-General and the Chairs of its
Main Committees;
• dates of the Conference;
• amendment to rule 34 of the rules of procedure to permit the
establishment of ‘subsidiary bodies’; and
• background documentation to be prepared for the Review
Conference.
Canada did not attempt to re-introduce the idea of a report on
the substantive discussions at this session, but its delegation
argued for an abandonment of the arrangements under which
the Treaty was reviewed on the basis of three clusters of issues
in favour of an article-by-article review.6  Agreement was
finally reached on the allocation of items to Main Committees,
but without prejudice to proposals for other arrangements.
Extensive discussions took place throughout the session on the
nature and number of the documents to be produced by
Review Conferences.  Initially, a large majority of the delega-
tions appeared to be in favour of two documents, a backward-
looking one and a forward-looking one, with others arguing
for a third document on the functioning of the strengthened
review process and yet others for further documents on
specific issues, such as the protocol on security assurances
proposed by South Africa.  The only states arguing at the
beginning for the traditional single Final Declaration were
France, supported by Egypt and Iran, but as the session
progressed this view gained more supporters.
Meanwhile, at the end of the first week of the session, the
Chairman had distributed two working papers.  The first con-
tained recommendations from the PrepCom on the products of
the Review Conference, as well as other organisational ques-
tions such as which ‘subsidiary bodies’ it might create.  The
second was a paper setting out possible substantive recom-
mendations from the PrepCom to the Conference. The work-
ing paper on ‘products’ evolved considerably in the course of
the second week and was twice re-issued in a significantly
modified form.  The changes focused on three distinct issues:
• the number of written products or ‘outcomes’ of the Review
Conference.  The paper left the Review Conference to seek
to resolve this basic question;
• the specific recommendations to be made to the 2000
Review Conference on the establishment of ‘subsidiary
bodies’.  Contested proposals were made for such bodies to
be created within Main Committee I (disarmament) and
Main Committee II (the Resolution on the Middle East). 
All decisions on the creation of specific subsidiary bodies
were remitted to the Review Conference; and
• item 17 on the draft Agenda for the Review Conference.  It
was agreed to change the wording of this Item to cover
‘measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the
Treaty and achieving its universality’, and discussion of
this was allocated to all three Main Committees, thus offer-
ing a specific context for discussing the contents of the
three collateral documents of 1995 in all of them.
The second working paper distributed by the Chairman was a
reworking of the first element of the Chair’s Working Papers
from the first and second sessions.  The 1999 document con-
sisted of 31 paragraphs, structured under the headings used in
the 1995 Principles and Objectives decision document. Dis-
cussion on this paper was conducted by requesting comments
on a paragraph by paragraph basis.  At the end of this process
delegations were encouraged to put all proposals on the text
that had been made orally in written form for consideration by
the Chairman.  At this stage in the proceedings, mid-way
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through the second week, the expectation of many delegations
was that the Chairman would rapidly produce a revised text of
what were seen as the substantive recommendations of the
PrepCom to the Review Conference, and that detailed negotia-
tions on its wording would then follow in a smaller group.
This Chairman’s text incorporated some of the specific
proposals made in the earlier discussions of the draft, to which
no strong objections had been made, and removed some of the
sections which had attracted significant opposition. As a
result, the document expanded from 31 to 61 paragraphs.
When the Chairman indicated that he proposed to move into
detailed negotiations on the text, several delegations indicated
they were willing to accept the document in its existing form if
its status was that of material to be forwarded to the Review
Conference for further development, and not as a set of con-
sensus recommendations: others did not.
At this point, the Chairman moved to a discussion of his
second text on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis, in order to
discover which paragraphs were unacceptable in their existing
form. 31 out of the 61 paragraphs were objected to during this
process.  As this exercise proceeded, however, it became clear
to many delegations that the key to whether the document
would represent an agreed set of ‘recommendations’ to the
Review Conference was to be found in whether its contents
would have priority status over other inputs into that Con-
ference.  There was no agreement on a way forward, and as a
consequence, the session ended with both versions of the
Chairman’s Working Paper being forwarded to the Review
Conference; no indication being offered of which of the 61
paragraphs in the second version had been objected to; and the
report of the session recording that ‘the Preparatory Commit-
tee was unable to reach agreement on any substantive
recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference’.
An Appraisal of the Operations of the Preparatory
Committee, 1997–99
In any appraisal of the operation of the PrepCom during 1997–
99, two contextual factors must be taken into account.  First,
many of the differences over its operation had links to intrac-
table substantive issues generated by events external to the
PrepCom process.  Second, the changes in the role of the
PrepCom were only one element of the strengthened review
process: the other was changes in the way the Review Con-
ference itself was to be conducted. As a consequence, the first
cycle of the strengthened review process may need to be
completed before it will be possible to evaluate fully the
effectiveness of that process.  However, it is feasible at this
point  to make an interim assessment of the way the PrepCom
functioned between 1997 and 1999, and to identify the options
for change in the workings of the PrepCom that the Review
Conference could consider for implementation in the period
2000–05.
The PrepCom’s Role
It appears that from 1995 onwards, states variously viewed the
role of the PrepCom as fulfilling at least four different general
objectives:
• placing more regular political pressure on parties to imple-
ment their commitments under the Treaty by forcing them
to address the issues normally discussed at Review Con-
ferences and requiring states to account for their perfor-
mance, on a near-annual basis;
• making the process of reviewing the Treaty at a Review
Conference more effective and using the time of that Con-
ference more efficiently by preparing the ground for its
debates in advance;
• providing the parties with the opportunity of discussing
relevant emerging issues on a more timely basis than
before; and
• placing greater emphasis than before on ‘looking forward’
as well as ‘looking back’.
In the course of its three sessions the PrepCom arguably has:
• placed more regular pressure on states parties to address
whether they were fulfilling their commitment under the
Treaty.  However, its effectiveness is a matter for debate;
• attempted to prepare the ground more effectively for debate
at the Review Conference by discussing substance
extensively, and introducing a mechanism to focus
discussion on specific issues.  However, it failed to make
any substantive recommendations or produce an agreed
product from those discussions;
• sought to address both ‘forward-looking’ and ‘backward-
looking’ issues.  However, it did not differentiate between
the two in draft documents nor make any systematic assess-
ment of the implementation of the Principles and Objec-
tives decision; and
• attempted to discuss and report on contemporaneous issues.
However, no agreement was possible on either the principle
or content of such reports.
The Substantive Outcomes of the PrepCom
Throughout its operation the PrepCom for the 2000 Review
Conference was hampered by lack of clear guidance as to the
detailed nature of the substantive product it should seek to
produce.  This guidance was lacking because in the first cycle
of the strengthened process, there was no experience to base
judgements on what the Review Conference itself would need
from the PrepCom.  As a consequence, a range of possible
outcomes from the PrepCom was suggested, including:
• a ‘rolling text’ which would form the recommendations
from the PrepCom to the Review Conference.  This could
either be consensual in nature or drafted on the basis of
there being both agreed and non-agreed items;
• a collation of proposals and other texts for use by the
Review Conference as resource material, and having equal
standing to national working papers;
• a text summarising the debates from each PrepCom session;
and
• a text distinguishing between the review of the operations
of the Treaty since the last Review Conference and the
targets that might be agreed to or adopted by the parties for
the next five year period.
Disagreements over Principles
At the core of the difficulties over the implementation of the
strengthened review process were disagreements in principle.
These will need to be taken into account if any agreement is to
emerge at the 2000 Conference on the implementation mecha-
nisms for that process in 2000–05.  They included whether:
• PrepCom sessions could address issues which might not be
relevant to discussions at the Conference that follows;
• PrepCom sessions were meetings of the parties to the NPT
with decision-making powers, or subordinate bodies of a
Review Conference, which alone has the ability to make
decisions;
• the strengthened review process should implement more
focused procedures, or should continue to allocate equal
time to the issues covered by the Main Committees; and
• the strengthened review process should be regarded as a
single, coherent activity, held together by the requirement
to start preparing material for the Final Declaration of a
PPNN Issue Review 4 April 2000
Review Conference three years before it is to be held, or
could be desegregated, with some PrepCom sessions per-
forming one range of tasks and others a different range?
Some Interim Conclusions
Several evaluations have emerged of the success or failure of
the PrepCom for the 2000 Review Conference.  Some ob-
servers argue that as the process is still in its infancy, it was
only to be expected that its mechanisms did not operate in a
particularly effective manner.  They have suggested that
nevertheless the PrepCom served a useful function by provid-
ing a road map showing the various routes the strengthened
review process might wish to take procedurally; airing sub-
stantive issues; and creating a useful resource for the Con-
ference in the form of the various Chairman’s Working
Papers.  Others believe that the outcome of the PrepCom was
determined by outside events and that if the international
security climate had been more propitious, it would have been
able to function effectively through the mechanisms it was
using. Yet others blame the NWS for the inability of the
PrepCom to agree recommendations, by not living up to the
commitments they made in 1995.
A final group, however, believe that it is unrealistic to expect
the PrepCom to play the role of making recommendations on
substance that it was given by the 1995 decision.  They argue
that each PrepCom session is part of a five-year cycle that
culminates in a Review Conference, which must assess past
performance and prescribe future action. Formulating recom-
mendations for specific language on the way the Treaty has
operated in the past, and on the needs and nature of future
action, inevitably involves a process of laborious bargaining
between states parties. There will always be different views on
many of the issues discussed, and this means that producing
any generally acceptable recommendations from this process
involves compromises all around. As national or caucus group
positions might have to be sacrificed, these necessary com-
promises will only be made when all other possibilities have
been exhausted. The moment for this is at the end of the
negotiation process, rather than during it, and thus in the final
week of a Conference, and not at the earlier PrepCom stage.
Only when issues are uncontroversial might recommendations
emerge from the PrepCom process, but the evidence of the
1999 session suggests that states parties are not prepared to
have these sent to the Conference in isolation.
Even if this last view is accepted, however, it does not mean
that the key elements of the strengthened review process can-
not be implemented.  There is no apparent disagreement on
what constitutes a strengthened review process, namely that:
• substance should be discussed by the PrepComs;
• the NWS should be called to account for their nuclear
disarmament activities on a near-annual basis; and
• the review process should look forward as well as back.
Disagreements do exist, however, over the issues of principle
identified earlier in this Issue Review.  Unless and until these
differences can be resolved, ignored  or by-passed, the
modalities of the strengthened review process and its outcome
threaten to remain a contested area.
The Review Conference’s role in ‘reviewing the
review’
If the Review Conference is to recommend a specific mode of
operation for the review process in 2000–05, it must start from
the Strengthening the Review Process decision of 1995, and
the need for it to be neither rewritten nor by-passed.  Rather,
the objective should be to interpret and clarify any ambiguous
language in this decision, and reach agreement in a consensual
manner on issues of detail on which it was silent. One respon-
sibility of the 2000 Review Conference will be to clarify the
purpose of the PrepCom and provide it with a more workable
set of proposals for implementing the decision on Strengthen-
ing the Review Process.  Although this will not be an easy
task, it may be assisted by decisions on its own products and
outcomes.  These decisions will offer the PrepCom for the
2005 NPT Review Conference more positive guidance than
was available to its predecessor on the types of recommenda-
tions it should produce.
Within that context, it seems desirable for the Review Con-
ference to first reach agreement on the general purpose of the
strengthened review process, and then establish the role of the
PrepCom within it.  It will need to make clear the status of the
PrepCom.  Is it a meeting of the parties rather than a subor-
dinate body of a Review Conference, and does it have the
authority to produce interim reports? If states parties answer
‘yes’ to the latter question, an annual assessment of progress
towards the goals set by a previous Review Conference will be
possible. If states parties answer ‘no’ to both parts of this
second question, the issue becomes what tasks should the
PrepCom undertake?
It could engage in the type of accounting for actions by the
NWS witnessed from 1997–99, and engage in drafting lan-
guage on relatively non-controversial substantive matters for a
‘rolling text’, though whether many states parties would
regard this as worthwhile must be open to doubt.  It is unlikely
they will wish to invest much time and effort in such proceed-
ings, or send senior diplomats and significant delegations to
three PrepCom sessions that were merely talking shops. Under
these conditions the strengthened review process could die a
slow death for lack of support.
This suggests that the majority of states parties are only likely
to continue to support the strengthened review process and
participate in it fully if the PrepCom is deemed to have the
authority to make interim evaluations and judgements of
progress towards the full implementation of the NPT. Only
under those conditions is a meaningful and cost-effective
strengthening of the review process likely to be perceived by
most states parties as having been achieved.
Options for the Next Cycle of the Strengthened
Review Process
Two basic caveats have to be made before drawing con-
clusions from the experience of the PrepCom in 1997–99.
One is that this experience cannot be evaluated in isolation
from external circumstances and from an appreciation of the
PrepCom’s essentially experimental nature.  The second is
that it is premature to make any final assessment of the success
or failure of the strengthened review process until the first and
second cycles have occurred.  In the meantime, however, it is
necessary to draw interim conclusions at the 2000 Review
Conference, and seek to implement any changes deemed
necessary to enable the process to operate more effectively in
the period through to 2005.
Such changes must focus, above all, on strengthening  the
effectiveness of the review process in achieving its substantive
aims.  They will involve making  judgements among compet-
ing proposals for how this could be done.  A range of these
exists, and by way of conclusion this Issue Review offers a
brief description of two of them.  Both assume that PrepCom
sessions must have some authority to produce interim reports,
and that the aspiration to concentrate on producing a ‘rolling
text’  for NPT Review Conferences would be abandoned.
Whether these changes will be acceptable to all the states
parties attending the 2000 NPT Review Conference, however,
remains to be seen.
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An Implementing or Accounting Committee
The first option, involving a process of periodic reviews of the
implementation of the Treaty, has two variants.  The first is
that the PrepCom should become an ‘implementing
committee’.7  This would be structured to promote discussions
aimed at the adoption of an annual ‘snapshot’ of progress
towards the previous Review Conference’s forward-looking
goals, and of the obstacles that are impeding this.  Each ses-
sion would create markers against which the following year’s
progress could be compared and offer a means of assessing, on
an annual basis,  the implementation of the previous Review
Conference’s decisions and objectives.
The second variant, an ‘accounting’ committee’,8 focuses on
making states more accountable for fulfilling their obligations
under the Treaty.  This has its roots in a statement made by
Jayantha Dhanapala,  President of the 1995 NPT Review and
Extension Conference, in which he suggested that the
strengthened review process could provide permanence of the
NPT ‘with accountability’.9  This has also been a theme
echoed by Canadian government officials.10  However, what
this implies has been the subject of differing interpretations.
While the NWS have had significant progress to report on
nuclear disarmament over the last five years, and have
produced accounts of what they have done at PrepCom ses-
sions, many states parties have interpreted accountability as
covering both what the NWS had and had not done in living
up to their Article VI obligations, and how they intend to
remedy perceived deficiencies.
To implement ‘permanence with accountability’, the NWS
(and possibly other states),11 would make statements at each
session of a PrepCom on the ways in which they have imple-
mented their obligations under the Treaty; what they have
done to meet the objectives set at a previous Review Con-
ference; and what they would do to implement their obliga-
tions under the Treaty in the future. Mechanisms might also be
created to enable a dialogue to take place on these statements
at each PrepCom session through a question and answer
process (possibly involving questions at one session and
answers at the next).   At the end of each year’s PrepCom
session a report would be made on the discussion, if necessary
in a non-consensual manner.  Thus the essence of this variant
is that it involves both looking forward as well as back.
Giving Sessions of the PrepCom Different tasks
In the period 1995-7, some consideration was given to the idea
of having each of the three initial PrepCom sessions con-
centrate on issues within the remit of one of the Main Commit-
tees only, and possibly moving their venue between New
York, Geneva and Vienna to facilitate this.12  This proposal
was not implemented, but it did indicate that an alternative
method of organising PrepCom sessions within the
strengthened review process was to have them focus upon
different issues.  With  the perception emerging strongly from
the PrepCom experience in 1997–99 that the early PrepCom
sessions are not suitable for engaging in preparations of
recommendations to Review Conferences, one way forward
may be to disaggregate the tasks of PrepCom sessions, though
not necessarily in the manner suggested before the 1997 Prep-
Com session.
Many ways of implementing such a disaggregation are pos-
sible.  One which may merit further examination and develop-
ment is to have states parties meet periodically in the three
years [or possibly even four years] prior to the year of a review
conference to review progress in implementing the Treaty in
the previous period, possibly in the form of the
‘implementing’ or ‘accounting’ committee discussed above.
This task, if undertaken annually, might be accomplished in a
period other  than the 10 working days suggested in the 1995
decision.  In the year of a Review Conference, however, one
or more further PrepCom sessions of a longer duration might
be held, with the specific mandate of making the procedural
and substantive preparations for the Conference.  One further
variant of this option would be to task early sessions of the
PrepCom with just collecting ideas and proposals, and only
engaging in detailed negotiations on recommendations to the
Review Conference at its later sessions.
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Documentation
Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty
1. The Conference examined the implementation of article VIII.3, of
the Treaty and agreed to strengthen the review process for the operation
of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble
and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.
2. The States party to the Treaty participating in the Conference
decided, in accordance with article VIII.3, of the Treaty, that Review
Conferences should continue to be held every five years and that,
accordingly, the next Review Conference should be held in the year
2000.
3. The Conference decided that, beginning in 1997, the Preparatory
Committee should hold, normally for a duration of 10 working days, a
meeting in each of the three years prior to the Review Conference.  If
necessary, a fourth preparatory meeting may be held in the year of the
Conference.
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4. The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to
consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full
implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make
recommendations thereon to the Review Conference.  These include
those identified in the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted on 11 May 1995.  These
meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the next
Review Conference.
5. The Conference also concluded that the present structure of three
Main Committees should continue and the question of an overlap of
issues being discussed in more than one Committee should be resolved
in the General Committee, which would coordinate the work of the
Committees so that the substantive responsibility for the preparation of
the report with respect to each specific issue is undertaken in only one
Committee.
6. It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established
within the respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant to
the Treaty, so as to provide for a focused consideration of such issues.
The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended
by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation
to the specific objectives of the Review Conference.
7. The Conference agreed further that Review Conferences should
look forward as well as back.  They should evaluate the results of the
period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertak-
ings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in
which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought
in the future.  Review Conferences should also address specifically
what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and
to achieve its universality.
Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament
Reaffirming the preamble and articles of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Welcoming the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of
international tension and the strengthening of the trust between States,
Desiring a set of principles and objectives in accordance with which
nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be
vigorously pursued and progress, achievements and shortcomings
evaluated periodically within the review process provided for in article
VIII (3) of the Treaty, the enhancement and strengthening of which is
welcomed,
Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control,
The Conference affirms the need to continue to move with
determination towards the full realisation and effective
implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly adopts
the following principles and objectives:
Universality
1. Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons is an urgent priority.  All States not yet party to the
Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date,
particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this
objective.
Non-proliferation
2. The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the
danger of nuclear war.  The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons has a vital role to play in preventing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons.  Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty
in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.
Nuclear disarmament
3. Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of
international tension and the strengthening of trust between States
which have prevailed following the end of the cold war.  The undertak-
ings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with
determination.  In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their
commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations
on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.
4. The achievement of the following measures is important in the full
realization and effective implementation of article VI, including the
programme of action as reflected below:
(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the
negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996.  Pending
the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-
weapon States should exercise utmost restraint;
(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of
negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable con-
vention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of
the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the
mandate contained therein;
(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of sys-
tematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally,
with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States
of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective inter-
national control.
Nuclear-weapon-free zones
5. The conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized
nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived
at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and
regional peace and security is reaffirmed.
6. The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in
regions of tension, such as in the Middle East, as well as the estab-
lishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction should be
encouraged as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific
characteristics of each region.  The establishment of additional nuclear-
weapon-free zones by the time of the Review Conference in the year
2000 would be welcome.
7. The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect
and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum
effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant
protocols.
Security assurances
8. Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995),
which was adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995, as well as the
declarations by the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative
and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to
assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons.  These steps could take the form of
an internationally legally binding instrument.
Safeguards
9. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the competent
authority responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the statute
of the IAEA and the Agency’s safeguards system, compliance with its
safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of
their obligations under article III(1) of the Treaty, with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.  Nothing should be done
to undermine the authority of the IAEA in this regard.  States parties
that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards
agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such
concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the IAEA
to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary
actions in accordance with its mandate.
10. All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and
bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have
not yet done so should do so without delay.
11. IAEA safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated.
Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors aimed at further
strengthening the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards should be sup-
ported and implemented and the IAEA’s capability to detect undeclared
nuclear activities should be increased.  Also States not party to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be urged
to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
12. New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special
fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or
prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary
precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and interna-
tionally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices.
13. Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful
nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under IAEA
safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in
place with the nuclear-weapon States.  Safeguards should be universal-
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ly applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been
achieved.
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
14. Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise
of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II as well as
III of the Treaty.
15. Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully
implemented.
16. In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-
weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing
countries particularly into account.
17. Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be
promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all
interested States party to the Treaty.
18. All States should, through rigorous national measures and inter-
national cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear
safety, including in waste management, and observe standards and
guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and
transport of nuclear materials.
19. Every effort should be made to ensure that the IAEA has the
financial and human resources necessary in order to meet effectively
its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and
nuclear safety.  The IAEA should also be encouraged to intensify its
efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assis-
tance through predictable and assured resources.
20. Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peace-
ful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns
regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such
cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
The Conference requests that the President of the Conference bring
this decision, the Decision on Strengthening the Review Process of
the Treaty and the Decision on the Extension of the Treaty to the
attention of the heads of State or Government of all States and seek
their full cooperation on these documents and in the furtherance of the
goals of the Treaty.
Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons
The Conference of the States Party to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
Treaty’) convened in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995, in
accordance with articles VIII,3 and X,2 of the Treaty,
Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty and affirming that there
is a need for full compliance with the Treaty, its extension and its
universal adherence, which are essential to international peace and
security and the attainment of the ultimate goals of the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control,
Having reaffirmed article VIII,3 of the Treaty and the need for its
continued implementation in a strengthened manner and, to this end,
emphasizing the Decision on Strengthening the Review Process for
the Treaty and the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament also adopted by the Conference,
Having established that the Conference is quorate in accordance
with article X,2 of the Treaty,
Decides that, as a majority exists among States party to the Treaty
for its indefinite extension, in accordance with its article X,2, the
Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.
Resolution on the Middle East
The Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Reaffirming the purpose and provisions of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Recognizing that, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to strengthening the
international non-proliferation regime,
Recalling that the Security Council, in its statement of 31 January
1992, affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear and all other weapons
of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and
security,
Recalling also General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus
supporting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the
Middle East, the latest of which is resolution 49/71 of 15 December
1994,
Recalling further the relevant resolutions adopted by the General
Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning
the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, the latest of
which is GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21 of 23 September 1994, and noting
the danger of nuclear proliferation, especially in areas of tension,
Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and in
particular paragraph 14 thereof,
Noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and paragraph 8 of
the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by the Conference on 11
May 1995,
Bearing in mind the other Decisions adopted by the Conference on
11 May 1995,
1. Endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process
and recognizes that efforts in this regard as well as other efforts
contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as
well as other weapons of mass destruction;
2. Notes with satisfaction that in its report Main Committee III of the
Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1) recommended that the Con-
ference ‘call on those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to
accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commit-
ment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and
to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their
nuclear activities’;
3. Notes with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and reaffirms in this connection the
recommendation contained in paragraph VI/3 of the report of Main
Committee III urging those non-parties to the Treaty which operate
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full scope International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
4. Reaffirms the importance of the early realization of universal
adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
and calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so,
without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to
place their nuclear facilities under full scope International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards;
5. Calls upon all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in
appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the
establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of
weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and
their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that
preclude the achievement of this objective;
6. Calls upon all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to
extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to
ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East
zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems.
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